Review of “The Zoning Dilemma,” By Daniel R. Mandelker by Whitman, Dale A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1971 Issue 1 
January 1971 
Review of “The Zoning Dilemma,” By Daniel R. Mandelker 
Dale A. Whitman 
North Carolina College Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dale A. Whitman, Review of “The Zoning Dilemma,” By Daniel R. Mandelker, 1971 WASH. U. L. Q. 133 
(1971). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/8 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS
THE ZONING DILEMMA. By Daniel R. Mandelker.1 Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 197 1, Pp. xvi, 204. $9.50.
Professor Mandelker is recognized as one of the leading figures of
American land use law. His experience is vast, and he has been
extraordinarily prolific. 2 This latest production generally maintains the
high standard set by his previous work, and embodies a good deal of
quite profound thinking about the crucial issues of zoning today.
Perhaps the most impressive feature of this book is its newness.
Roughly two-thirds of the cases cited were decided in the 1960's and
other references are equally current. Professor Mandelker's field
research was conducted in 1968 and 1969. The overwhelming impression
is one of modernity; the book gives the reader a remarkably up-to-date
"feel" for the concepts and operations of American zoning as it
approaches its fiftieth anniversary.3
The title seems a bit misleading, since the author has really written
about a variety of dilemmas (though not all, to be sure) which zoning
presents. Mandelker begins by reminding us that the American version
of zoning is far from being the only system imaginable; indeed, its
features, viewed objectively, seem quite odd. For example, our zoning
operates primarily at a highly localized level. There are only the most
limited federal4 or statewide controls, and there is usually no provision
for state or even county administrative review of municipal zoning
decisions. Moreover, our system has no mechanism for compensating
those whose economic values are diminished by zoning decisions; even in
1. Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
2. The flyleaf and footnotes of the instant book disclose eight law review articles, three books,
and two chapters in symposia written by the author in the past decade.
3. Although there were earlier ordinances of limited scope, modern American zoning may be
dated from the adoption of New York City's first comprehensive ordinance in 1916, or perhaps
from the publication by the Department of Commerce of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
in 1922. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.07-2.10 (1968).
4. Any serious attempt at federal intervention in zoning would be likely to encounter massive
resistance. Illustrative is the quiet introduction by the Nixon administration of an amendment to its
own 1970 housing legislation which would have over-ridden, under certain limited circumstances,
local zoning which excludes low-income housing. See Hearings on Housing and Urban
Development Legislation-1970 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19-20 (1970); N.Y. Times, June 3, 1970, at 1,
col. 5 (city ed.). The administration evidently concluded that the political costs of a genuine effort on
the point were too high; little effort was made on its behalf, and it appeared in neither the House nor
Senate committee bills.Washington University Open Scholarship
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the unlikely event that a court finds a particular decision beyond the
scope of the police power, zoning officials must ordinarily withdraw, and
if compensation is to be paid, a fresh approach by local government via
eminent domain is necessary. Similarly, zoning ordinarily makes no
provision for recoupment of the economic benefits produced by a
particular decision, or for that matter, by public projects or general
urbanization and extension of municipal services. The American theory
is that zoning is "mere" regulation, with the public agency legally
unconcerned about either the costs or benefits the regulation entails.
Since the only non-local review of zoning decisions is judicial review, it
is important to understand the scope of that review. On its face, the
scope is narrow. A court is entitled to ask only three questions about a
decision: first, is it constitutional; second, does it comply with state
enabling legislation (or, in some cases, a city's charter powers); and
third, does the decision comply with the city's 5 own ordinance? The
judges have applied these tests with characteristic ingenuity, sometimes
finding it convenient to insert themselves into issues of the wisdom or
fairness of the zoning decision, and in other cases appearing to defer
gallantly to local zoning officials. Among the devices contributing to the
variability of the scope of judicial review are the concept of "spot
zoning", the requirement of conformance to a comprehensive plan, and
the presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments. Professor
Mandelker treats at length a series of Maryland cases involving the
"rule" of that state that zoning amendments are proper only if
conditions have changed or the prior zoning was a mistake. He shows the
enormous ambiguity of the "change or mistake" rule and the latitude it
gives for judicial intervention or deference as the court thinks necessary.
But Mandelker believes that courts generally avoid explicit discussion
of broad-gauge planning policy, concentrating instead on the individual
or neighborhood impacts of zoning decisions. This tendency may be a
result of several factors: a hold-over of the pre-zoning era of judicial
thought, in which the law of private nuisance was the judiciary's
principal land-use tool; the difficulty of relating comments on planning
policy to the traditional areas of judicial review; and perhaps an
admission of incompetence by the judges in the wider sphere of planning
policy.
Mandelker's point here is that formulating planning policy involves
5. This discussion assumes that the zoning entity is city government. But there is a growing trend
toward delegation of zoning powers to counties and other governmental units as well.
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the making of hard judgments on social values, and that there is
something of a vacuum of power in the making of such judgments. He
quotes Professor Reich's view6 that such judgments can never be neutral,
nor even fair in any absolute sense. Almost every imaginable planning
decision harms some interests in society and aids others; the judicial
image of blindfolded justice with scales is simply not meaningful in this
context. Nor have the other participants in zoning systems found it easy
to articulate these value judgments. Professional planners, in particular,
appear to be in the throes of a major identity crisis over the issue of their
proper role in the making of planning value judgments. 7
The first half-century of American zoning has seen a major shift in
legal rationale. Initially, zoning took its cue from private nuisance law,
which was concerned with curbing external diseconomies 8 of a highly
sensate nature: excessive noise, air and water pollution, odors, vibration
and the like. Zoning's judicial Magna Charta, the Euclid9 opinion,
draws heavily on nuisance analogies, and contains some remarkably
strained language depicting multi-family apartment buildings as
nuisances. The hierarchial structure of traditional zoning ordinances,
with the single-family home at the apex of the pyramid, reflects the
nuisance-law orientation of the designers of zoning. Today's planners
intend to use zoning for much broader purposes-to require
internalization of not only such external diseconomies as odor, noise,
and pollution, but also diseconomies reflected in matters of taste,
convenience, and the smooth and efficient functioning of a whole
community. Nuisance focused on an immediate neighborhood, while
modern planning is broader, more regional, in scope. Mandelker
6. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
7. See A. ALTSCHULER, THiE CITY PLANNING PROCESS 392-405 (1965); F. RABINOWITZ, CITY
PLANNING AND POLITICS 11-14 (1969); Ozbekian, "Can" Implies "Ought", in PLANNING FOR
DIVERSITY AND CHOICE 208-09, 212-19 (S. Anderson ed. 1968); Rein, Social Planning: The
Search for Legitimacy, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 233 (1969).
8. The term "external diseconomy" here means any cost or economic hardship imposed on
neighboring owners by a particular land use. A common objective of public policy is to require
"internalization" of such externalities-i.e., the imposition of the costs back against the landowner
whose activities produce them. This may be attempted in a variety of ways: by compensatory
payments made to those who suffer from the externality; by police-power regulation of the
"offending" use; by zoning which excludes it entirely; by tax policy, etc. See Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960), pointing out that in an economic sense it is not meaningful
to regard either of two neighboring land users as "offending" or as "producing" the external cost;
the problem is simply one of the proximity of two land uses incompatible with one another. Yet,
where one of the uses is a single-family residence, the American scheme of social values usually
regards its owner as the "offended" party, deserving of protection.
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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suggests that judicial thinking may not have kept well up with this shift
in the viewpoint of zoning decision-makers.
Zoning's ability to compel the internalization of external
diseconomies may be conveniently considered in two situations: existing
urbanized neighborhoods and newly-developed areas. Zoning has proved
rather weak in the reduction of pre-existing non-conforming uses in
developed areas, a weakness Mandelker attributes primarily to
constitutional restraints on the amortization of such uses. The
constitutional limits are not well developed, and amortization is no
panacea in any event,' 0 but the power to eliminate nonconformance
seems a little like some wag once said of religion-its problem is not so
much that it has failed as that it has not been tried.
But clearly, zoning's greatest opportunity for impact is in newly-
developing areas. Here, it would seem, zoning has the opportunity to
serve as a tool of positive planning, without the limitations of nuisance
concepts in the types of uses to be controlled or the spatial area of their
impact. The classic model of zoning for developing areas consists of a
series of steps something like the following:
I. A plan (read "general plan" or "master plan" or the like) is
formulated by professional planners and adopted by the local legislative
body.
2. The legislative body then enacts a zoning ordinance which zones
all sites in accord with the plan previously adopted.
3. Private entrepreneurs then develop these sites at intensities of land
use approximating the maximum permitted by the zoning ordinance.
4. The sites are occupied for their developed residential, commercial,
industrial and institutional uses, and a pleasant, well-functioning
environment results.
Even a novice is likely to suspect that this model is naive and
improbable. A major part of Professor Mandelker's thesis is a step by
step investigation of the planning-zoning process in a real metropolitan
area, King County (metropolitan Seattle), Washington, with the intent
of comparing it with the ideal model discussed above. The King County
experience, of course, may not be entirely generalizable, but
Mandelker's observations seem to me to have wide application.
Mandelker concentrated on the specific problem of zoning and
development of multi-family apartments in newly-developing suburban
areas of the county. In King County, he discovered, pre-zoning of
10. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 6.62-6.71 (1968).
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apartments was almost never done. Although the county had a fairly
sophisticated general plan, the plan did not locate specific sites for
apartments, but only gave general verbal criteria for their location.
These criteria were broad enough so that pre-zoning of all qualifying
sites would have produced far too many apartment locations for the
market to absorb. Moreover, pre-zoning would probably have opened
the zoning authorities to heated charges of favoritism and "spot
zoning". So the zoning authorities adopted a policy which Mandelker
calls "watchful waiting". Virtually no undeveloped land was zoned for
apartments until the owner made application for re-zoning to multi-
family use. The zoning authorities then considered the particular site's
qualifications in the light of the general plan's criteria (and perhaps in
the light of other factors as well), and granted or denied the application.
A major flaw in this system, as in a system of complete pre-zoning, is
the fact that the public body merely zones, but does not develop the land.
There is no compulsion for the developer to move forward with
construction, and many successful applicants for re-zoning do not in fact
develop within a reasonable time after apartment zoning is approved.
Such land owners are, Mandelker believes, making a purely economic
decision to forego a present profit in the expectation that the present
value of anticipated future sale or development is greater. Such a
decision obviously involves risk to the owner, but the fact that re-zoning
has been obtained reduces the risk substantially. This stockpiling of re-
zoned land by owners complicates the planning process enormously, first
because public planners cannot predict the timing of development, and
second because they cannot even predict with certitude the nature of the
use to which the land will actually be put-this last uncertainty deriving
from the fact that an owner may procure multi-family zoning and yet
later decide that, say, single-family use will be more profitable. These
uncertain linkages between zoning and actual development greatly
reduce the precision with which an on-going planning department can
function.
Other problems arise in the translation of a general plan's concepts
into a specific zoning ordinance. Such plans are usually far more
generalized than ordinances are obliged to be. The plans may contain
maps, but if so, their scale is too large and their boundaries too indistinct
to permit their direct correlation with a zoning ordinance. Whether or
not the plan contains a map, the zoning ordinance and re-zoning
decisions usually are made primarily with reference to the textual
statements of policy in the plan. Mandelker found that the King County
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plan failed to adequately guide the zoning ordinance in several respects.
It did not account, for example, for the timing of apartment
development-its policy statements referred only to the spatial location
of apartments. And although the plan mentioned proximity to arterial
highways and business developments as appropriate criteria for
apartment sites, it gave no quantitiative information on how close to
highways and business developments a proposed apartment site must be
to qualify.
Mandelker also faults the King County plan for its failure to make
explicit its societal value judgments. For example, the plan called for
apartments only in the relatively high-density "centers" of urbanization
within the county. Yet the plan not only failed to define precisely the
locations or boundaries of these centers, but it also failed, at least on its
face, to consider the social impact of such a policy on apartment
location. Mandelker suggests that land costs in such centers are likely to
be relatively high, thus producing higher rents and working hardship,
perhaps unnecessarily, on the relatively lower income tenants who
cannot afford home ownership and must live in the apartments. And to
the extent that the newly-built apartments become the most attractive
homes available to members of the minority races, the plan's result may
be the building of new ghettos. This last criticism goes to the merits of
the plan itself, and Mandelker may be somewhat unfair in assuming that
these objections to the "apartments in centers" plan were not fully aired
and found acceptable when the plan was developed. The "centers"
concept has obvious advantages, especially for rapid-transit utilization,
but because the concept is becoming increasingly popular," it is well to
make its potential problems as explicit as possible.
Professor Mandelker observed a genuine effort by zoning officials to
make their decisions accord with the comprehensive plan insofar as its
ambiguities allowed, although the lay political agencies tended toward
somewhat more leniency to developers than did the professionally-
staffed planning department. Little corruption was discernable in the
system. The principal problems in King County planning-zoning were
twofold: first, the inadequacies and inexplicitness of the plan itself, and
i1. Mandelker refers at some length to MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
COMMISSION, A PRELIMINARY MASTER PLAN FOR BOWIE-COLLINGTON AND VICINITY PLANNING
AREAS 71, 74 (1969). Other "apartments in centers" proposals include Los ANGELES
DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, THE CONCEPT FOR THE Los ANGELES GENERAL PLAN (1970);
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION, TWIN CITIES AREA
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT GUIDE 48 (1968).
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second, the intrinsic weaknesses of zoning as a tool to control, rather
than merely to permit, development of a given type.
At this point Mandelker disappoints his reader, who hopes to be
presented in the book's concluding pages with a program of reform. But
the author demurrs. He seems to believe that solutions to these dilemmas
will require heroic measures -measures which he doubts American
society is presently ready to accept. Although he makes some cursory
comments on proposals such as general programs of public acquisition
of undeveloped lands, the author seems content, for the present, to have
delineated the problems.
Unfortunately, the book is not a highly readable one. The author's
hope, expressed in the introduction, that the book will prove attractive
and useful to urban planners and other professionals, seems unlikely to
be fully realized, for the prose is often difficult to follow, particularly in
those portions analyzing trends in judicial decisions. The strong hand of
an experienced editor would have been welcome here. And the discussion
of the statistical evidence of factors bearing on zoning decisions in King
County was rough sledding for this reviewer, in part at least, because of
its manner of presentation; the reader is sorely tempted to pass over the
elaborate tables of figures and hurry on to the textual discussion of
results.
But these minor flaws should not discourage the serious student of
zoning, for Professor Mandelker's slim volume will yield generous
insights not available elsewhere. The Zoning Dilemma is a genuinely
valuable contribution to the literature of American planning law.
DALE A. WHITMAN*
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, THE NEW
LEGALITY. By William F. Swindler.' Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., 1970. Pp. 479. $12.95.
In a sense, the Supreme Court is like a multi-sided prism in that when
light is cast on any of its facets, it is reflected, defused and refracted to
illuminate all of its facets. William Swindler has cast the light of his own
peculiar inquiries upon the court and its jurisprudence in a way that
* Visiting Professor of Law, North Carolina College Law School.
1. Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
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